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Vocational	   education	   and	   training	   (VET)	   systems	   are	   shown	   as	   critical	  
institutions	   for	   middle-­‐income	   countries	   (MICs)	   to	   continue	   their	   economic	  
growth	  and	  to	  make	  this	  growth	  more	  inclusive.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  VET	  will	  help	  
to	   improve	   these	   countries’	   comparative	   advantage	   in	   producing	  higher	   value-­‐
added	  goods	   (Middleton	  et	   al.,	   1993;	  Ashton	  et	   al.,	   1999;	  Nilsson,	  2010;	  Doner	  
and	   Schneider,	   2016).	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   VET	   systems	  will	   play	   an	   important	  
role	   in	   attaining	   more	   inclusive	   growth,	   as	   these	   systems	   create	   more	  
opportunities	   for	   individuals	   from	   lower	   income	   groups	   and	   with	   lower	  
academic	  scores	  (Acemoglu	  and	  Pischke,	  1999;	  Busemeyer,	  2015a;	  Estevez-­‐Abe	  
et	   al.,	   2001;	   Rueda	   and	   Pontusson,	   2000;	   Thelen,	   2004)	   (Acemoglu	  &	   Pischke,	  
1999;	  Rueda	  &	  Pontusson,	  2000;	  Estevez-­‐Abe,	  Iversen,	  &	  Soskice,	  2001;	  Thelen,	  
2004;	  Busemeyer,	  2015a).	  	  
Despite	   its	   importance,	   research	   on	   the	   VET	   systems	   of	   MICs	   has	   been	  
surprisingly	  scarce.	  Studies	  on	  skill	  formation	  in	  MICs	  have	  focused	  on	  education	  
systems	   in	   general,	   without	   differentiating	   between	   vocational	   and	   general	  
education.	   More	   recent	   research	   on	   the	   political	   economy	   of	   development	   in	  
MICs	   have	   studied	   VET	   systems	   and	   discussed	   the	   political	   coalitions	   that	  
promote	  or	  prevent	  VET	  policies	  (Doner	  and	  Schneider,	  2016,	  2019;	  Sancak	  and	  
Özel,	  2018).	  Nonetheless,	  there	  is	  still	  dearth	  of	  research	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  VET	  
systems	  in	  MICs	  and	  the	  partisan	  politics	  that	  shape	  this	  structure.	  The	  structure	  
of	  VET	   systems	   is	   important	  because	   it	  defines	   the	   types	  of	   skills	   generated	   in	  
these	   systems,	   such	   as	   specific	   or	   general	   skills,	   which	   then	   have	   different	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implications	  for	  workers	  and	  firms,	  and	  thus	  inclusive	  development	  (Busemeyer,	  
2015a).	   Furthermore,	   VET	   structures	   are	   formed	   through	   distinct	   political	  
struggles	   and	  partisan	  alliances,	   as	   they	  benefit	   different	   socio-­‐political	   groups	  
(Thelen,	  2004;	  Busemeyer,	  2015c).	  Therefore,	  an	  analysis	  on	  the	  partisan	  politics	  
and	  structure	  of	  VET	  system	  constitutes	  an	  important	  gap	  in	  the	  discussions	  on	  
VET	  systems	  and	  inclusive	  development	  in	  MICs.	  	  
Although	  the	  influence	  of	  partisan	  politics	  on	  VET	  policies	  has	  been	  extensively	  
discussed	   in	   the	   literature	   on	   VET	   systems	   in	   advanced	   capitalist	   economies,	  
these	  studies	  are	  not	  sufficient	  to	  explain	  the	  case	  of	  VET	  in	  MICs.	  This	  is	  because	  
the	   studies	   on	   advanced	   economies	   have	   focused	   on	   the	   class	   struggles	   and	  
partisan	  alliances	   in	   the	  20th	   century	  and	  hence	  studied	  the	  role	  of	   ‘traditional’	  
political	   groups	   and	   these	   groups’	   partisan	   alliances,	   which	   have	   become	   the	  
‘insiders’	  of	  the	  political	  economic	  systems	  in	  these	  countries.	  However,	  in	  MICs,	  
socio-­‐political	  groups	  and	  political	  struggles	  are	  very	  different,	  which	  will	  lead	  to	  
distinct	  VET	  policies	  in	  these	  countries.	  	  
This	   article	   studies	   the	   impact	   of	   partisan	   politics	   on	   the	   structure	   of	   VET	  
systems	   in	  MICs.	   It	   focuses	  on	   the	   case	  of	  Turkey	   in	   the	   early	  2000s.	  Different	  
from	  many	  MICs,	  Turkey	  had	  a	  series	  of	  stable	  governments	  in	  the	  2000s	  which	  
were	  led	  by	  a	  strong	  political	  party,	  the	  Justice	  and	  Development	  Party	  (Adalet	  ve	  
Kalkınma	  Partisi-­‐	  AKP).	  The	  main	  constituents	  of	  this	  party	  were	  not	  insiders	  of	  
the	  previous	  political	  economic	  system	  but	  rather	  were	  outsiders,	  namely	  small	  
and	  medium	  sized	  enterprises	  (SMEs)	  and	  workers	  with	   insecure	  employment.	  
During	   the	   2000s,	   the	   governing	   alliance	   in	   Turkey	   shifted	   in	   favour	   of	   the	  
outsiders	  while	  the	  Turkish	  VET	  system	  experienced	  important	  changes.	  Turkey	  
is	  therefore	  an	  important	  case	  study	  for	  tracing	  the	  impact	  of	  outsiders	  and	  their	  
partisan	  alliances	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  VET.	  With	  this	  analysis,	  which	  will	  be	  the	  
first	  one	  on	  a	  MIC,	  the	  article	  aims	  to	  expand	  the	  debates	  on	  the	  partisan	  politics	  
and	   VET	   on	   advanced	   capitalist	   economies	   to	   MICs	   and	   to	   enhance	   our	  
understanding	  about	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  VET	  in	  MICs.	  This	  study	  then	  can	  
be	   followed	   by	   similar	   research	   on	   other	   MICs,	   especially	   those	   that	   recently	  
have	   been	   experiencing	   important	   developments	   in	   their	  VET	   systems	   such	   as	  
Malaysia	  and	  Chile1	  (see	  Doner	  and	  Schneider,	  2019	  for	  further	  discussion).	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The	   research	   in	   this	   article	   is	   based	   on	  process-­‐tracing	   of	   the	   continuities	   and	  
changes	   of	   partisan	   competition	   and	   VET	   policies	   during	   the	   AKP’s	   first	   two	  
terms	  (2002-­‐2011),	  2	  and	  compares	  this	  with	  the	  period	  prior	  to	  the	  2000s.	  The	  
article	  utilises	   the	   secondary	   literature	   to	  understand	   the	  partisan	  politics	   and	  
political	   competition	   in	   Turkey.	   Additionally,	   it	   adopts	   the	   approach	   of	  
Busemeyer	   and	   Trampusch	   (2012)	   with	   Thelen’s	   (2014)	   extension	   to	   analyse	  
the	  impact	  of	  these	  dynamics	  on	  VET	  systems.3	  It	  examines	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  
VET	  system,	  namely	  the	  state’s	  commitment	  to	  and	  firms’	  involvement	  in	  VET	  in	  
terms	   of	   the	   financing,	   management,	   and	   provision	   of	   VET,	   and	   analyses	   the	  
possibility	  of	  VET	  as	   a	   viable	   alternative	   to	   general	   education	   (Busemeyer	   and	  
Trampusch,	  2012).	  Data	  for	  this	  study	  includes	  primary	  documents	  related	  to	  the	  
party	   and	   government	   programmes,	   policy	   documents,	   business	   associations	  
and	   labour	   unions	   publications,	   and	   reports	   by	   civil	   society	   and	   international	  
organisations.	   Additionally,	   sixteen	   face-­‐to-­‐face,	   in-­‐depth	   interviews	   were	  
conducted	  with	  bureaucrats	   in	   relevant	  ministries	  and	  representatives	  of	  main	  
business	  associations,	  labour	  unions,	  and	  other	  VET	  related	  organisations.4	  
The	  political	  economy	  and	  structure	  of	  VET	  systems	  
The	  literature	  on	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  MICs	  provides	  an	  extensive	  discussion	  
on	   the	   political	   coalitions	   and	   institution	   formation	   in	   these	   countries.	   These	  
studies	   argue	   that	   institutions	   that	   would	   bring	   inclusive	   and	   continuous	  
development	  could	  not	  be	  formed	  in	  many	  MICs	  due	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  coalitions	  
that	  block	  policy	  reforms	  as	  well	  as	  the	  absence	  of	  certain	  coalitions	  that	  would	  
support	  such	  reforms	  (Kaufman	  and	  Nelson,	  2004;	  Kohli,	  2004;	  Schneider,	  2004;	  
Haggard	   and	   Kaufman,	   2008;	   Doner	   and	   Schneider,	   2016;	   Holland	   and	  
Schneider,	  2017).	  The	  importance	  of	  education	  policies	  for	  development	  has	  also	  
been	  emphasised	   in	  many	  studies	  on	  development	   in	  MICs	  (Birdsall	  and	  Sabot,	  
1997;	  Ranis	  et	  al.,	  2000;	  Hanson,	  2008;	  Hanushek	  and	  Woessmann,	  2008;	  Aiyar	  
et	  al.,	  2013).	  Nonetheless,	  the	  research	  on	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  VET	  has	  been	  
surprisingly	  scarce	  (see	  Doner	  and	  Schneider,	  2016).	  	  	  
Some	   recent	   studies	   have	   focused	   on	   different	   elements	   of	   skill	   formation	  
systems	  in	  MICs	  (Doner	  and	  Schneider,	  2016;	  Sancak	  and	  Özel,	  2018;	  Bogliaccini	  
and	  Madariaga,	  2018;	  Doner	  and	  Schneider,	  2019;	  Bruns	  et	  al.,	  2019).	  	  The	  work	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of	   Doner	   and	   Schneider	   (2016)	   is	   a	   significant	   one	   regarding	   the	   political	  
coalitions	   and	   skill	   formation.	   The	   authors	   argue	   that	   state-­‐promoted	  
industrialisation	   in	   large	   upper	   MICs	   created	   both	   vertical	   and	   horizontal	  
inequalities	  that	  benefited	  the	  insiders	  of	  the	  political	  economic	  system	  in	  these	  
countries,	  namely	  large	  firms	  and	  labour	  market	  insiders	  in	  formal	  employment.	  
These	  arrangements,	  moreover,	  impeded	  education	  reform	  and	  the	  development	  
of	   strong	   VET	   systems	   (Doner	   and	   Schneider,	   2016;	   Schneider,	   2013,	   2009;	  
Schneider	  and	  Karcher,	  2010).	  Studies	  on	  Newly	  Industrialised	  Countries	  (NICs)	  
in	   East	   Asia	   constitute	   another	   important	   line	   of	   research	   on	   the	   political	  
economy	  of	  VET.	   It	   has	  been	   argued	   that	  NICs	  moved	   from	   the	  middle	   to	  high	  
income	   group	   much	   earlier	   thanks	   to	   the	   ‘developmental	   states’	   that	   worked	  
‘closely	  with	  industrialists’	  and	  promoted	  VET	  systems	  in	  these	  countries	  (Wade,	  
1990,	  p.	  295;	  Lee,	  2011;	  Fleckenstein	  and	  Lee,	  2019).	  	  
Notwithstanding	   its	   contribution	   to	   our	   understanding,	   the	   research	   on	   the	  
political	   economy	   of	   VET	   in	   MICs	   suffers	   from	   two	   main	   shortcomings.	   First,	  
these	   studies	   talk	   about	   VET	   policies	   in	   general	   without	   an	   analysis	   on	   the	  
structure	  of	  those	  systems.	  Many	  studies	  on	  MICs	  are	  based	  on	  aggregate	  data	  on	  
VET	  systems	  provided	  by	   international	  organisations,	  such	  as	   the	  share	  of	  VET	  
students	  in	  secondary	  education	  (Doner	  and	  Schneider,	  2019,	  2016).	  While	  this	  
data	  may	  give	  a	  general	   idea	  about	  VET	  systems,	   it	  does	  not	  show	  the	   types	  of	  
skills	  generated	  in	  these	  systems.	  For	  example,	  they	  do	  not	  differentiate	  between	  
school-­‐based	   and	   firm-­‐based	   VET	   systems	   although	   the	   former	   is	   argued	   to	  
generate	  more	  general	  skills	  and	  create	   lower	  educational	   inequality	  compared	  
to	   the	   latter	   (Thelen,	   2014;	   Busemeyer,	   2015a).	   Furthermore,	   aggregate	   data	  
provided	  by	   international	  organisations	  does	  not	   always	   reflect	   the	   realities	  of	  
national	   VET	   systems	   and	   sometimes	   may	   even	   contradict	   one	   another.	   For	  
example,	  according	  to	  the	  World	  Bank,	  25	  per	  cent	  of	  secondary	  school	  students	  
in	  2015	  were	  in	  vocational	  schools	  in	  Turkey	  while	  the	  OECD	  data	  for	  the	  same	  
year	   is	  49	  per	  cent	  (World	  Bank,	  2019;	  OECD,	  2019).	  Therefore,	  an	  analysis	  on	  
the	   structure	  of	  VET	  systems	   in	  MICs	   is	   fundamental	   to	   fully	  understand	   these	  
systems	  and	  their	  implications	  for	  inclusive	  development.	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The	   second	   main	   shortcoming	   is	   related	   to	   the	   first	   point	   and	   is	   about	   the	  
partisan	  politics	   that	   shape	   the	   structure	   of	   VET	   systems.	   The	   studies	   on	  MICs	  
have	   discussed	   the	   state’s	   role	   in	   VET	   systems	   as	   a	   ‘bureaucratic’	   actor	  
overlooking	   its	   ‘political’	   role	   which	   will	   be	   shaped	   by	   the	   political	   parties	  
governing	   the	   state	   (Busemeyer,	   2015b).	   For	   example,	   Doner	   and	   Schneider	  
(2016,	   p.	   619)	   argue	   that	   political	   parties	   in	   MICs	   can	   often	   be	   “populist,	  
redistributive,	  and/or	  corrupt”	  with	  a	  tendency	  to	  focus	  on	  short-­‐term	  horizons,	  
which	  they	  argue	  has	  led	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  attention	  given	  to	  VET	  policies	  that	  would	  
facilitate	  longer	  term	  development.	  A	  few	  researchers	  have	  emphasised	  the	  role	  
of	   ‘strong’	   political	   parties	   to	   compensate	   for	   the	   weak	   coalitions	   that	   would	  
promote	   education	   policies	   bringing	   sustainable	   and	   inclusive	   development	  
(Bizzarro	   et	   al.,	   2018;	   Bruns	   et	   al.,	   2019;	   Doner	   and	   Schneider,	   2019).	  
Nevertheless,	  none	  of	  these	  studies	  discuss	  the	  impact	  of	  partisan	  politics	  on	  VET	  
systems.	  	  
Political	   parties	   can	   influence	   VET	   systems	   in	   two	  main	  ways.	   Firstly,	   political	  
parties	  that	  have	  links	  with	  different	  socio-­‐political	  groups	  will	  promote	  distinct	  
VET	   policies	   addressing	   their	   constituents’	   interests	   (Iversen	   and	   Stephens,	  
2008;	  Busemeyer,	   2015c).	   Secondly,	   political	   parties	   can	   play	   an	   active	   role	   in	  
creating	   the	   necessary	   coalitions	   for	   VET	   through	   ‘political	   articulation’	   and	  
shape	  VET	  policies	  accordingly	  (Leon	  et	  al.,	  2009).	  Therefore,	  MICs	  with	  different	  
partisan	  alliances	  and	  political	  competition	  will	  have	  distinct	  VET	  systems	  with	  
diverse	  implications	  for	  inclusive	  development.	  	  	  
The	  analysis	  on	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  VET	  in	  MICs	  can	  benefit	  from	  literature	  
on	   the	   political	   economy	   of	   social	   policies	   and	   varieties	   of	  
capitalism/comparative	   capitalisms.	   The	   research	   on	   advanced	   industrialised	  
countries	   in	   this	   regard	  provides	   an	   extensive	   discussion	   on	   partisan	   alliances	  
and	  the	  impact	  of	  these	  alliances	  on	  VET	  policies.	  These	  discussions	  are	  based	  on	  
the	   claims	   that	   workers	   and	   firms,	   individuals	   from	   different	   socioeconomic	  
backgrounds,	  and	  firms	  with	  different	  sizes	  have	  distinct	  preferences	  regarding	  
vocational	  and	  general	  education	  (Culpepper,	  2003;	  Iversen	  and	  Stephens,	  2008;	  
Busemeyer,	   2009,	   2015b).	   These	   different	   groups	   develop	   links	   with	   distinct	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political	   parties,	   which	   then	   promote	   VET	   policies	   that	   reflect	   the	   interests	   of	  
their	  constituents	  (Boix,	  1998;	  Ansell,	  2010).	  	  
Researchers	   combining	   the	   power	   resources	   and	   comparative	   capitalisms	  
literatures	  argue	  that	  the	  dominance	  of	  three	  main	  political	  parties	  in	  advanced	  
industrialised	   countries,	   namely	   Social	   Democrats,	   Christian	   Democrats	   and	  
secular	  Conservatives,	  has	  led	  to	  ‘three	  worlds	  of	  human	  capital	  formation’	  with	  
different	   socio-­‐economic	   outcomes	   (Iversen	   and	   Stephens,	   2008;	   Busemeyer,	  
2015c).	   These	   researchers	   maintain	   that	   the	   dominance	   of	   left	   governments	  
supported	   by	   labour	   unions	   in	   the	   Nordic	   countries	   like	   Sweden	   prioritise	  
workers’	  interests	  in	  VET	  systems,	  which	  resulted	  in	  statist/integrationist	  initial-­‐
VET	   systems	   with	   high	   state	   commitment,	   low	   firm	   involvement,	   and	   high	  
permeability	   between	   vocational	   and	   general	   (higher)	   education	   (Busemeyer	  
and	   Schlicht-­‐Schmälzle,	   2014;	   Busemeyer,	   2015d).	   Higher	   state	   involvement	  
resulted	  in	  higher	  public	  spending	  also	  on	  continuing-­‐VET	  programmes	  (Rueda,	  
2006;	  Iversen	  and	  Stephens,	  2008;	  Emmenegger	  et	  al.,	  2012;	  Thelen,	  2014).	  Also,	  
the	  VET	  systems	  are	  argued	  to	  have	  an	  important	  influence	  on	  the	  low	  levels	  of	  
inequality	  in	  these	  countries	  (Thelen,	  2004;	  Busemeyer,	  2015a).	  	  
As	   Christian	   Democratic	   parties	   are	   based	   on	   a	   cross-­‐class	   coalition	   between	  
workers	  and	  employers,	  they	  are	  argued	  to	  issue	  VET	  policies	  that	  address	  both	  
groups’	  interests.	  Therefore,	  countries	  with	  predominantly	  Christian	  Democratic	  
governments	   such	   as	  Germany	  developed	   initial-­‐VET	   systems	  with	   high	   public	  
commitment	   and	   high	   firm	   involvement,	   which	   led	   to	   more	   specific	   training	  
restricting	   the	   possibility	   to	   continue	   to	   higher	   education	   (Busemeyer	   and	  
Trampusch,	   2012;	   Busemeyer,	   2015c).	   Moreover,	   lower	   state	   involvement	   in	  
these	  countries,	  compared	  to	  the	  Nordic	  countries,	  resulted	  in	  weak	  continuing-­‐
VET	   systems	   (Thelen,	   2014).	   In	   contrast,	   the	   governments	   with	   secular	  
Conservative	  parties,	  such	  as	  the	  UK	  and	  US,	  prioritise	  business’	  interests	  in	  VET	  
systems	  and	  aim	  to	  maintain	  limited	  taxation.	  VET	  does	  not	  constitute	  a	  priority	  
for	   these	  parties,	  which	   result	   in	  VET	  systems	  with	   low	  state	  commitment	  and	  
low	   firm	   involvement	   in	   countries	   with	   such	   governments	   (Iversen	   and	  
Stephens,	   2008;	   Thelen,	   2014;	   Busemeyer	   and	   Schlicht-­‐Schmälzle,	   2014;	  
Busemeyer,	   2015c).	   Last,	   it	   is	   argued	   that	   the	   VET	   systems	   promoted	   by	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Christian	   Democrats	   lead	   to	   higher	   levels	   of	   inequality	   compared	   to	   those	  
promoted	   by	   Social	   Democrats	   while	   they	   create	   less	   income	   inequality	  
compared	   to	   the	   weak	   VET	   systems	   of	   secular	   Conservatives	   (Busemeyer,	  
2015a).	  Table	  1Error!	  Reference	  source	  not	   found.	  summarises	  the	  literature	  
on	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  VET	  in	  advanced	  capitalist	  economies.	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Despite	   its	   important	   insights,	   the	  studies	  on	  advanced	  industrialised	  countries	  
have	   focused	  on	  only	   the	   class-­‐based	  power	   struggles	  between	  businesses	   and	  
labour	   unions,	   which	   were	   the	   main	   actors	   during	   industrialisation	   in	   these	  
countries	   and	  have	  become	   the	   insiders	  of	   the	  political	   and	  economic	   systems,	  
and	   these	   groups’	   alliances	  with	   left-­‐wing	   or	   right-­‐wing	   political	   parties.	   Such	  
analysis	   cannot,	   and	  does	  not	   aim	   to,	   explain	   the	  dynamics	   in	  MICs,	  where	   the	  
insiders	   and	   outsiders,	   partisan	   politics	   and	   political	   competition	   are	   very	  
different.	   For	   example,	   these	   arguments	  will	   not	  be	   valid	   for	  MICs	  where	   class	  
struggles	  were	   not	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   political	   competition	   (Rodrik,	   2015;	   Doner	  
and	  Schneider,	  2016).	  	  
There	   are	   many	   other	   social,	   economic,	   and	   political	   groups	   that	   have	   been	  
excluded	  in	  the	  traditional	  political	  alliances	  and	  have	  become	  the	  ‘outsiders’	  in	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the	  dominant	  political	  and	  economic	  systems.5	  	  SMEs	  and	  workers	  with	  insecure	  
employment	  form	  two	  main	  groups	  of	  outsiders	  in	  MICs	  and	  have	  different	  VET	  
interests,	   which	   may	   sometimes	   contradict	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   insiders.	   For	  
example,	  while	  large	  firms	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  support	  state	  investment	  in	  general	  
education	  rather	   than	  VET,	  smaller	   firms	  are	  expected	   to	  promote	  more	  public	  
investment	   in	  VET	  due	   to	   their	   disadvantages	   in	   organising	   firm-­‐level	   training	  
(Culpepper,	   2003).	   Similarly,	   labour	   market	   outsiders,	   who	   are	   mostly	   in	  
insecure	   employment,	   are	   not	   covered	   in	   social	   protection	   systems	   or	  
represented	  by	  labour	  unions,	  will	  prefer	  public	  investment	  in	  initial-­‐VET	  more	  
than	   the	   insiders	   as	   it	   improves	   the	   opportunities	   of	   these	   individuals	   to	   get	  
better	  and	  more	  secure	   jobs	   (Boix,	  1998;	  Estevez-­‐Abe	  et	  al.,	  2001;	   Iversen	  and	  
Stephens,	   2008;	   Busemeyer	   et	   al.,	   2011;	   Busemeyer,	   2015c).	   In	   the	   end,	   VET	  
systems	   supported	   by	   outsiders	   will	   have	   different	   partisan	   politics	   and	  
characteristics	   from	   the	   VET	   systems	   shaped	   by	   the	   insiders.	   Although	   the	  
literature	   on	   social	   policies	   in	   MICs	   has	   discussed	   the	   political	   economy	   of	  
‘inclusive’	  and	  ‘restrictive’	  social	  policies	  for	  insiders	  and	  outsiders	  (Garay,	  2016;	  
Huber,	   1996),	   these	   studies	   focus	   on	   only	   traditional	   social	   policies	   without	  
discussing	   the	   case	   of	   VET,	   which	   plays	   a	   major	   role	   in	   shaping	   individuals’	  
income	  and	  welfare	  (Busemeyer,	  2014).	  	  
Insiders,	  outsiders	  and	  the	  VET	  system	  in	  Turkey	  
Currently	   VET	   in	   Turkey	   takes	   place	   through	   three	  main	   channels,	   where	   the	  
Vocational	  High	  Schools	  (VHSs)	  as	  part	  of	  the	  upper-­‐secondary	  formal	  education	  
constitute	   the	   largest	   share	   (Figure	  1).	   The	   apprenticeship	   system	   is	   the	  other	  
example	   of	   initial-­‐VET	   yet	   has	   a	   small	   part	   in	   the	   VET	   system.	   The	   public	  
retraining	  programmes,	   in	   the	  scope	  of	  continuing-­‐VET,	   form	  the	   third	  channel	  
for	  VET	  in	  Turkey	  and	  they	  have	  gained	  a	  significant	  share	  in	  the	  2000s.	  VHSs	  are	  
centrally	  managed	   by	   the	  Ministry	   of	   National	   Education	   (MEB)	   and	   the	  main	  
training	  takes	  place	  at	  schools	  while	  students	  must	  complete	  a	  practical	  training	  
in	  a	  firm.	  Both	  the	  MEB	  and	  Confederation	  of	  Turkish	  Tradesmen	  and	  Craftsmen	  
(TESK)	  manage	  the	  apprenticeship	  system,	  in	  which	  most	  training	  takes	  place	  in	  
a	  firm.	  While	  firms	  are	  obliged	  to	  provide	  training	  to	  VHS	  students	  according	  to	  
the	   Labour	   Law,	   their	   participation	   to	   the	   apprenticeship	   system	   is	   voluntary.	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Continuing-­‐VET,	   moreover,	   is	   under	   the	   control	   of	   the	   Turkish	   Employment	  
Agency	   (İŞKUR)	   while	   firms,	   and	   especially	   the	   Union	   of	   Chambers	   and	  
Commodity	   Exchanges	   of	   Turkey	   (TOBB),	   have	   become	   a	   key	   partner	   in	   the	  
continuing-­‐VET	  programmes	  in	  the	  2000s.	  
Figure 1: Distribution of individuals in public VET programmes (2012) 
 
Source:	  Author,	  based	  on	  İŞKUR	  (2012),	  MEB	  (2012a)	  &	  MEB	  (2013)	  
a. Partisan	  politics,	  political	  competition	  and	  the	  VET	  system	  prior	  to	  the	  2000s	  
The	   main	   socio-­‐political	   and	   socio-­‐economic	   groups	   in	   Turkey	   have	   been	  
described	  as	  the	  ‘centre’	  and	  ‘periphery’	  with	  contrasting	  cultural	  and	  economic	  
interests	   (Mardin,	   1973).	  6	  The	   centre,	   constituting	   the	   insiders	   of	   the	   Turkish	  
political	   and	   economic	   system,	   is	   comprised	   of	   the	   secular	   elite	   and	   the	  more	  
educated	  population	  mainly	  from	  the	  Western	  regions,	  who	  were	  considered	  the	  
economic	   ‘winners’	  of	   the	   import	  substituting	   industrialisation	  (ISI)	  period	  and	  
the	   subsequent	   economic	   liberalisation	   (Öniş,	   2012).	   Large	   firms	   from	   the	  
Western	   regions	   have	   been	   the	   insiders	   amongst	   the	   firms,	   as	   they	   benefited	  
from	   the	   state	  policies	   through	  developing	   links	  with	   the	   state	   and	   influencing	  
policymaking	   in	   line	  with	   their	   interests	   (Buğra,	  1998;	  Öniş	  and	  Türem,	  2001).	  
The	   exclusive	   business	   association,	   the	   Turkish	   Industry	   and	   Business	  
Association	  (TÜSİAD),	  is	  a	  major	  institution	  representing	  the	  interests	  of	  insider	  
firms	  and	  influenced	  not	  only	  the	  economic	  policy	  but	  also	  other	  types	  of	  public	  
policy	   in	   Turkey	   (Öniş	   and	   Türem,	   2001).	   Furthermore,	   the	   more	   educated	  
workers	   formed	   the	  working-­‐class	  members	   of	   the	   insiders.	   These	   individuals	  
were	  employed	  in	  the	  large	  firms	  or	  in	  the	  public	  sector	  with	  formal	  and	  secure	  
employment.	   They	   were	   protected	   against	   social	   risks	   through	   the	   insurance-­‐
based	  social	   security	   system	  which	  was	  developed	   in	   the	   ISI	  period	  and	  which	  
was	  not	  able	  to	  provide	  welfare	  to	  a	  large	  segment	  of	  the	  population	  (Öniş,	  2000;	  
Sancak,	  2011;	  Dorlach,	  2015).7	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Both	   firms	   and	  workers	   in	   the	   ‘periphery’	   had	  different	   cultural	   and	   economic	  
interests	  from	  the	  ‘centre’	  and	  thus,	  were	  the	  outsiders	  of	  the	  political	  economic	  
system.	   In	   general,	   the	  outsiders	   comprise	   the	   conservative,	   religious,	   agrarian	  
population	   and	   the	   rural-­‐urban	   migrants	   with	   mostly	   low	   level	   of	   education	  
(Kalaycıoğlu,	   1994;	   Çarkoğlu	   and	   Hinich,	   2006;	   Öniş,	   2012).	   The	   SMEs	  mostly	  
from	  Anatolian	  cities	  constituted	  the	  outsiders	  amongst	  firms.	  These	  firms	  have	  
faced	   significant	   economic	   and	   political	   challenges	   but	   had	  marginal	   access	   to	  
policymaking	   to	   express	   these	   challenges	   until	   the	   2000s	   (Özel,	   2014).	  
Furthermore,	  workers	  with	   lower	   levels	   of	   education	   and	   those	   in	   insecure	   or	  
informal	   jobs	  constituted	  the	  labour	  market	  outsiders.	  These	  workers	  were	  not	  
covered	   by	   the	   public	   social	   security	   system,	   making	   the	   arbitrary	   social	  
transfers	  the	  only	  welfare	  provision	  available	  to	  this	  group	  (Eder,	  2010;	  Dorlach,	  
2015).	  	  
Although	  the	  insiders	  and	  outsiders	  had	  distinct	  economic	  and	  cultural	  interests,	  
the	   political	   parties	   prior	   the	   2000s	   focused	   mostly	   on	   the	   cultural	   interests.	  
Similar	   to	   many	   MICs,	   a	   class	   structure	   and	   class-­‐based	   politics	   constituted	   a	  
marginal	   part	   in	   political	   competition	   in	   Turkey	   (Özman	   and	   Coşar,	   2000).	  
Although	  unions	  gained	  some	  power	  in	  the	  1970s,	  they	  mostly	  represented	  the	  
formal	   workers	   of	   large	   firms	   and	   state-­‐owned	   enterprises.	   Furthermore,	   the	  
union	   movement	   took	   place	   under	   heavy	   state	   control	   and	   unions	   were	  
suppressed	   substantially	  with	   the	  military	   coup	   in	   1980	   (Aydoğanoğlu,	   2011).	  
Even	   though	   the	   unions	   were	   re-­‐established	   after	   the	   coup,	   they	   have	   not	  
become	  powerful	  players	  in	  policymaking	  (Çelik,	  2013).	  	  
Instead	  of	  the	  economic	  interests,	  the	  cultural	  interests,	  namely	  religious-­‐secular	  
conflict,	   were	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   the	   political	   competition	   in	   Turkey.	   The	   parties	  
representing	   the	   insiders,	   such	   as	   the	   Republican	   People’s	   Party,	   focused	   on	  
maintaining	   the	   secular	   principles	   in	   the	   country	   and	   have	   become	   the	  
‘guardians’	  of	   the	   secular	   state	   (Özman	  and	  Coşar,	  2000).	  Likewise,	   the	  parties	  
supported	  by	   the	  outsiders,	   such	  as	   the	   Islamist	  Welfare	  Party,	   focused	  on	   this	  
group’s	   cultural	   interests	   and	  maintaining	   a	   conservative	   and	   religious	   society	  
(Kalaycıoğlu,	  1994).	  The	  centrist	  parties	  having	  constituents	   from	  both	  groups,	  
like	   the	   Motherland	   Party,	   were	   the	   ones	   with	   more	   focus	   on	   the	   economic	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policy.	   However,	   they	   promoted	   neoliberal	   economic	   policies	   together	   with	  
traditional	   social	   policies,	   which	   mainly	   benefited	   the	   labour	   market	   insiders	  
while	   the	  outsiders’	   economic	  needs	  were	  not	   addressed	   (Öniş,	   2012;	  Dorlach,	  
2015).	  	  
The	  focus	  on	  the	  cultural	   interests	   in	  political	  competition	  and	  the	  disregard	  of	  
economic	  interests	  resulted	  in	  the	  continuation	  of	  the	  political	  economic	  system	  
benefiting	  only	   the	   insiders’	  economic	   interests	   (Kalaycıoğlu,	  1994;	  Öniş,	  2000,	  
2012;	  Özman	  and	  Coşar,	  2000;	  Secor,	  2001).	  Although	  governments	  of	   centrist	  
parties	   in	   the	   1990s	   introduced	   some	   neoliberal	   economic	   policies	   that	   could	  
benefit	   the	   SMEs,	   these	   policies	   were	   ad-­‐hoc	   and	   unstructured,	   resulting	   in	  
corruption	  scandals	  and	  weak	  improvement	  of	  the	  SMEs	  (Karadag,	  2010).	  There	  
were	   also	   no	   major	   changes	   in	   the	   welfare	   system	   in	   this	   period	   and	   its	  
segmented	  structure	  persisted,	  benefiting	  only	  the	  labour	  market	  insiders	  (Eder,	  
2010;	  Sancak,	  2011;	  Dorlach,	  2015).	  	  
Due	  to	  the	  political	  struggles	  around	  cultural	  cleavages,	  there	  were	  no	  significant	  
developments	   in	   the	   VET	   system	   after	   its	   official	   establishment	   in	   1986.	   The	  
insiders	   were	   already	   in	   a	   more	   advantageous	   position	   and	   focused	   on	  
maintaining	   their	   privileges	   in	   the	   economic	   and	   welfare	   system.	   On	   the	   one	  
hand,	   large	   firms	   had	   better	   access	   to	   the	   educated	  workforce	   thanks	   to	   their	  
reputation	  and	  established	  their	  own	  VET	  centres	  for	   further	  technical	   training	  
(Taşkın-­‐Alp,	   2014;	   Taşlı,	   2017).	   Therefore,	   rather	   than	   promoting	   VET,	   these	  
large	  firms	  and	  collective	  organisations	  representing	  them,	  like	  TÜSİAD,	  centred	  
their	  activities	  on	  other	  policy	  areas	  (Öniş	  and	  Türem,	  2001).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  
labour	  market	  insiders	  could	  receive	  training	  through	  their	  formal	  employment	  
in	   large	   firms	  or	   the	  public	   sector	   and	   focused	  on	  maintaining	   their	   privileged	  
benefits	   in	  the	  labour	  market	  and	  the	  protective	  welfare	  system	  (Sancak,	  2011;	  
Dorlach,	  2015).	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  insiders,	  the	  SMEs	  and	  labour	  market	  outsiders	  
would	  be	  the	  ones	  benefiting	  the	  most	  from	  VET	  (Culpepper,	  2003;	  Thelen,	  2004;	  
Busemeyer,	  2015a).	  However,	  none	  of	  these	  groups	  had	  the	  necessary	  means	  to	  
mobilise	   their	   economic	   interests	   and	   promote	   VET	  while	   the	   political	   parties	  
representing	  them	  mostly	  focused	  on	  their	  cultural	  interests.	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Not	   surprisingly,	   the	   major	   changes	   in	   the	   Turkish	   VET	   system	   in	   the	   1990s	  
happened	  due	  to	  the	  cultural	  cleavages	  between	  the	  insiders	  and	  outsiders.	  The	  
religious	  preacher	  schools,	   İmam	  Hatips,	  were	  recognised	  as	  vocational	  schools	  
in	   Turkey,	  making	   the	   VET	   system	   a	   part	   of	   the	   religious-­‐secular	   conflict.	   The	  
parties	   representing	   the	  outsiders	   focused	  on	   improving	  only	   the	   İmam	  Hatips	  
while	  the	  secular	  groups	  aiming	  to	  weaken	  Islamism	  took	  measures	  that	  created	  
substantial	   problems	   for	   the	   public	   VET	   system	   in	   general	   (Kenar,	   2010;	   ERG,	  
2012a).	   Following	   the	  military	  memorandum	   against	   the	   Islamist	   government	  
and	   the	   closure	   of	   Welfare	   Party,	   the	   ‘ratio	   obstacle’	   (katsayı	   engeli)	   was	  
introduced	  in	  1998	  to	  reduce	  the	  appeal	  of	  İmam	  Hatips,	  which	  made	  the	  general	  
VET	  system	  unpopular.	  This	  obstacle	  put	  VHS	  students	  at	  a	  disadvantage	  in	  the	  
calculation	  of	   their	   scores	   in	   the	   centralised	  university	  entrance	  exam,	   limiting	  
the	   permeability	   between	   vocational	   and	   general	   (higher)	   education.	   This	  
resulted	   in	  substantial	  drop	   in	  participation	  rates	   in	  VHSs	  (World	  Bank,	  2008).	  
As	  a	  result,	  the	  segregation	  between	  vocational	  and	  general	  education	  intensified	  
and	  VET	   became	   an	   option	   only	   for	   those	  with	   low	   academic	   scores	   and	   from	  
lower	  income	  groups,	  undermining	  the	  potential	  of	  the	  VET	  system	  for	  inclusive	  
development	  (Kenar,	  2010;	  ERG,	  2012a).	  	  
b. Partisan	  politics,	  political	  competition	  and	  the	  VET	  system	  in	  the	  2000s	  	  
The	  2000s	  became	  important	  years	  for	  both	  the	  party	  politics	  and	  VET	  system	  in	  
Turkey.	  The	  Justice	  and	  Development	  Party	  (AKP)	  has	  been	  the	  only	  governing	  
party	  since	  2002	  and	  has	  had	  its	  main	  support	  from	  the	  SMEs	  and	  labour	  market	  
outsiders.	   The	   party	   developed	   policies	   to	   address	   the	   interests	   of	   its	  
constituents	   from	   both	   groups.	   However,	   rather	   than	   simply	   reflecting	   the	  
grievances	   of	   these	   groups,	   the	   party	   played	   an	   active	   role	   in	  moulding	   these	  
interests	  within	   the	   public	   policies	   (De	   Leon	   et	   al.,	   2009).	   The	   VET	   policies	   of	  
2000s	  have	  been	  shaped	  by	  AKP	  and	  reflected	  its	  constituents’	  interests	  through	  
three	  main	  ways:	   (1)	   the	  party’s	   focus	  on	  addressing	   the	  economic	   interests	  of	  
the	  outsiders;	   (2)	   the	  party’s	  deliberate	  selection	  of	   the	  VET	  system	  to	  address	  
these	  economic	  interests;	  and	  (3)	  its	  active	  role	  in	  incorporating	  the	  interests	  of	  
different	  groups	  of	  the	  outsiders	  in	  VET	  policies.	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AKP	  came	  as	  the	  party	  with	  absolute	  majority	   in	  the	  2002	  elections,	  right	  after	  
the	  economic	  crisis	  of	  2001	  which	  created	  devastating	  consequences	  especially	  
for	   the	   SMEs	   and	   labour	   market	   outsiders	   (Öniş,	   2012).	   After	   the	   exhausting	  
experiences	   of	   the	   1990s	   with	   political	   instabilities	   and	   economic	   crises,	   the	  
voters	  of	  the	  2002	  elections	  saw	  AKP	  as	  a	  way	  out	  of	  their	  economic	  miseries	  as	  
it	   ‘signalled	   the	  masses	   that	   [it]	  would	   change	   the	   status	   quo	   and	   adopt	  more	  
caring	  policies’	  (Çarkoğlu,	  2002,	  p.	  36).	  The	  party’s	  focus	  on	  economic	  interests,	  
moreover,	   helped	   to	  maintain	   its	   support	  base	   comprising	   the	  outsiders	  of	   the	  
previous	  system,	  namely	  the	  SMEs	  and	  workers	  with	  insecure	  employment.	  The	  
socio-­‐economic	   situation	   of	   these	   outsiders	   has	   improved	   substantially	   in	   the	  
2000s,	  which	  made	  Turkey	  as	  a	  good	  example	  of	  inclusive	  growth	  (Azevedo	  and	  
Atamanov,	   2014).	   This	   progress,	   moreover,	   became	   a	   central	   element	   in	   the	  
party’s	   election	   campaigns	   in	   later	   years	   and	   has	   been	   a	  major	   reason	   for	   the	  
increase	  in	  AKP	  votes	  in	  the	  subsequent	  elections	  (Çarkoğlu,	  2012,	  2008).	  	  
VET	  became	  an	  important	  tool	  for	  AKP	  to	  address	  the	  interests	  of	  both	  SMEs	  and	  
labour	   market	   outsiders.	   While	   the	   SMEs	   explicitly	   stated	   their	   interests	  
regarding	  the	  VET	  system,	  it	  was	  the	  AKP	  governments	  who	  proposed	  VET	  as	  a	  
solution	   to	   the	   concerns	   of	   labour	   market	   outsiders.	   Therefore,	   AKP	   played	   a	  
central	   role	   in	   bringing	   together	   the	   interests	   of	   the	   SMEs	   and	   labour	  market	  
outsiders	  through	  VET,	  namely	  carrying	  out	  an	  example	  of	  ‘political	  articulation’	  
(Leon	   et	   al.,	   2009;	   Tuğal,	   2012).	   The	   remainder	   of	   this	   section	   discusses	   the	  
SMEs’	  and	  labour	  market	  outsiders’	  VET	  interests	  and	  AKP’s	  position	  concerning	  
VET.	   The	   next	   section	   will	   then	   provide	   a	   detailed	   discussion	   on	   how	   the	  
interests	   of	   both	   SMEs	   and	   labour	  market	   outsiders	  were	   reflected	   in	   the	  VET	  
policies	  in	  the	  2000s.	  	  
1. SMEs	  and	  VET	  interests	  
The	   SMEs	   constituted	   a	  major	   group	   in	   AKP’s	   supporters,	   who	   had	   particular	  
interests	   in	   the	   VET	   system	   and	   have	   become	   an	   influential	   actor	   in	  
policymaking	   in	  the	  2000s.	  AKP	  developed	   links	  with	  the	  business	  associations	  
representing	   the	   SMEs,	   such	   as	   the	   Independent	   Industrialists’	   and	  
Businessmen’s	   Association	   (MÜSİAD)	   and	   the	   Turkish	   Confederation	   of	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Businessmen	   and	   Industrialists	   (TUSKON). 8 	  Furthermore,	   the	   Union	   of	  
Chambers	   and	   Commodity	   Exchanges	   of	   Turkey	   (TOBB),	  which	   is	   an	   umbrella	  
organisation	  for	  chambers	  of	  commerce	  and	  industry	  and	  mainly	  represents	  the	  
SMEs,	  gained	  a	  significant	   leverage	  during	   the	  AKP	  governments	  and	  became	  a	  
major	  actor	  shaping	  the	  public	  policies	   in	  Turkey	  (ETF,	  2004;	  Sancak	  and	  Özel,	  
2018).	  With	   these	   links,	   the	  AKP	  governments	  of	   the	  2000s	   introduced	  several	  
policies	  that	  addressed	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  SMEs.	  	  
VET	   constituted	   a	   major	   part	   in	   SMEs’	   economic	   interests	   and	   the	   business	  
organisations	   representing	   the	   SMEs	   were	   very	   active	   in	   advocating	   for	   VET	  
policies.	   The	   economic	   growth	   of	   the	   Turkish	   SMEs	   escalated	   in	   the	   2000s,	  
increasing	   these	   firms’	  demand	   for	   skilled	  workers,	   and	  especially	   for	  workers	  
with	  technical	  skills	  (Gür	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  Consequently,	  business	  organisations	  such	  
as	   MÜSİAD	   and	   TOBB	   carried	   out	   several	   activities	   for	   promoting	   VET.	   For	  
example,	   MÜSİAD	   published	   reports	   about	   the	   VET	   system’s	   problems	   and	  
proposed	  detailed	  policy	  recommendations	  (Şencan,	  2008).	  TOBB	  has	  especially	  
been	   an	   important	   actor	   for	   the	   Turkish	   VET	   system.	   It	   not	   only	   published	  
documents	   on	   the	   system’s	   problems	   and	   proposed	   solutions	   to	   it,	   but	   also	  
created	  new	  offices	  and	  employed	  new	  personnel	  dedicated	  solely	   to	  VET.	  The	  
chairman,	   Rıfat	   Hisarcıklıoğlu,	   has	   been	   very	   active	   in	   this	   regard	   and	  
emphasised	   the	   importance	   of	   improving	   the	   VET	   system	   in	   major	   platforms,	  
such	  as	  the	  opening	  speech	  of	  the	  5th	  Industrial	  Congress,	  where	  he	  said	  
“Turkey	   strongly	   needs	   a	   mobilisation	   to	   transform	   its	   skill	   system.	   If	  
competition	   is	   becoming	   more	   knowledge-­‐based,	   we	   must	   adjust	   the	  
qualities	   of	   our	   workforce	   accordingly.	   The	   way	   to	   create	   more	   value-­‐
added	  depends	  on	   a	  more	  qualified,	  more	   equipped	   and	  knowledgeable	  
workforce.	  The	   reason	  of	  unemployment	   today	   stems	   from	   the	   fact	   that	  
what	   the	   industry	   needs	   and	   the	   skills	   generated	   in	   our	   schools	   do	   not	  
match	  each	  other.”	  (TOBB,	  2006).	  
TOBB	  wanted	  to	  increase	  its	  direct	   involvement	  in	  both	  initial-­‐	  and	  continuing-­‐
VET	   programmes	   and	   stated	   this	   demand	   openly.	   It	   called	   for	   ‘vocational	  
education	  mobilisation’	  and	  requested	  an	  increase	  in	  public	  investments	  in	  VET	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as	   well	   as	   an	   expansion	   of	   TOBB’s	   role	   in	   its	   management	   (TEPAV,	   2010).	  
Furthermore,	   it	   demanded	   the	   transfer	   of	   VHSs’	   management	   to	   itself	   (TOBB,	  
2015).	  With	   these	   developments	   and	  AKP’s	   links	  with	   this	   organisation,	   TOBB	  
has	  become	  the	  main	  partner	  of	  the	  state	  in	  the	  Turkish	  VET	  system	  and	  had	  a	  
direct	  influence	  on	  VET	  policies.	  	  
In	  contrast	  to	  SMEs,	   large	  firms	  were	  more	  concerned	  about	  general	  education.	  
For	  example,	  TÜSİAD	  called	   for	  more	  public	   investment	   in	  general	   and	   secular	  
education	   and	   published	   reports	   promoting	   public	   investment	   in	   STEM	  
education	   (science,	   technology,	   engineering,	   mathematics)	   (TÜSİAD,	   2011;	  
Sancak	   and	   Özel,	   2018).	   Although	   some	   large	   firms	   got	   involved	   in	   the	   public	  
VET	   system	   through	   corporate	   social	   responsibility	   projects,	   these	   were	  
voluntary	   involvement	   of	   individual	   firms,	   mostly	   to	   develop	   skills	   for	   that	  
particular	   firm,	   rather	   than	  promoting	  structural	  changes	   in	   the	  VET	  system	   in	  
the	  country	  (UNDP	  IICPSD,	  2014).	  	  
2. Labour	  market	  outsiders	  and	  VET	  interests	  
The	   labour	  market	  outsiders	   in	  Turkey	  and	  have	  been	  the	  other	  main	  group	  of	  
AKP’s	  constituents	  with	  particular	  interests	  in	  the	  VET	  system	  (Çarkoğlu,	  2008;	  
2008).	   These	   workers,	   mostly	   with	   lower	   levels	   of	   education	   and	   from	   lower	  
income	   groups,	   face	   higher	   risks	   of	   unemployment	   and	   insecure	   and	   informal	  
employment	   in	   labour	   markets.	   The	   traditional	   ‘protective’	   social	   policies	  
comprising	   social	   insurance	   and	   social	   transfers	   have	   not	   been	   sufficient	   to	  
address	  the	  economic	  and	  social	  risks	  faced	  by	  these	  individuals.	  To	  address	  the	  
economic	   interests	  of	   these	  workers,	  AKP	  promoted	   ‘productive’	   social	  policies	  
which	  would	   bring	   an	   ‘equality	   of	   opportunity’	   (Patton,	   2009;	   Dorlach,	   2015).	  
Within	  the	  productive	  social	  policies,	  VET	  has	  had	  a	  key	  role,	  as	  it	  would	  improve	  
the	  opportunities	  of	  the	  labour	  market	  outsiders	  for	  more	  secure	  employment	  in	  
higher	  paid	  jobs.	  However,	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  SMEs,	  the	  labour	  market	  outsiders	  
did	  not	  have	  institutionalised	  ways	  to	  organise	  and	  represent	  their	  interests	  and	  
did	   not	   directly	   ask	   for	   VET	   policies.	   Instead,	   it	  was	   the	   party	  who	   decided	   to	  
focus	  on	  the	  VET	  system	  to	  address	  this	  group’s	  economic	  interests.	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VET	   at	   initial	   and	   continuing	   levels	   has	   become	   a	   key	   policy	   tool	   for	   the	   AKP	  
governments	   to	   address	   risks	   of	   ‘unemployment’	   and	   ‘economic	   insecurity’,	  
which	   were	   stated	   as	   the	   two	   major	   societal	   problems	   in	   the	   country	   in	   the	  
2000s	   (EC,	  n.d.).	   Furthermore,	   the	   labour	  market	  outsiders	  had	  higher	   risks	  of	  
being	  unemployed	  or	  being	  employed	  in	  insecure	  jobs.	  Realising	  these	  issues,	  all	  
major	   documents	   issued	   by	   AKP,	   such	   as	   the	   development	   plans	   and	   party	  
programmes,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   specific	   documents	   concerning	   the	   education	   and	  
employment	  policy	  focused	  on	  VET	  as	  the	  key	  strategy	  for	  welfare	  provision	  and	  
for	  addressing	  unemployment.	  This	  was	  especially	  the	  case	  after	  the	  2008	  global	  
financial	   crisis,	   which	   surged	   the	   unemployment	   rates	   in	   the	   country	   and	  
threatened	   the	   party’s	   popularity. 9 	  The	   government	   aimed	   to	   reduce	   the	  
unemployment	  via	  re-­‐training	  and	  re-­‐employment	  and	  quadrupled	  the	  budget	  of	  
the	   Turkish	   Employment	   Agency	   (İŞKUR)	   (ÇSGB,	   2016).	   The	   retraining	  
programme	  called	  Specialised	  Vocational	  Training	  Centres	  (UMEM)	  project	  was	  
also	  introduced	  at	  this	  time	  and	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  Erdoğan	  himself	  promised	  to	  
provide	  jobs	  to	  one	  million	  unemployed	  through	  this	  project	  (Hürriyet,	  2010).	  	  
While	  AKP	  promoted	  VET	  as	  a	  major	  policy	   tool	   for	  addressing	  unemployment	  
and	  welfare	  provision,	  which	  would	  benefit	   the	   labour	  market	  outsiders,	  other	  
political	   actors’	   activities	   in	   this	   regard	   remained	  more	   limited.	   The	   unions	   in	  
Turkey,	   which	   represent	   a	   marginal	   share	   of	   the	   formal	   workforce,10 	  have	  
focused	  on	  the	  issues	  around	  collective	  bargaining	  and	  workplace	  safety.	  These	  
unions	   did	   not	   pay	  much	   attention	   to	   VET	   as	   a	  way	   of	   skill	   formation,	   secure	  
employment	   or	   welfare	   provision.	   They	   considered	   VET	   merely	   as	   a	   way	   of	  
maintaining	  workplace	  health	  and	  safety.	  In	  fact,	  the	  representatives	  of	  two	  key	  
labour	   unions	   interviewed	   for	   this	   study	   did	   not	   even	   mention	   VET	   for	   skill	  
formation	   and	   focused	   on	   the	   aspects	   related	   to	   work	   accidents.11	  Hak-­‐İŞ,	   an	  
Islamist	  trade-­‐union	  which	  has	  offered	  an	  alternative	  way	  of	  collective	  action	  for	  
workers	   but	   had	   a	   very	   small	   membership	   base	   until	   recently	   (Duran	   and	  
Yildirim,	   2005;	   Öztürk,	   2018),	  was	  more	   interested	   in	   VET	   compared	   to	   other	  
unions.	  However,	   this	   interest	  was	  not	   in	   the	   traditional	  corporatist	  sense	  as	   it	  
was	  the	  case	  in	  VET	  systems	  in	  countries	  with	  Christian	  Democrat	  governments.	  
Instead,	   the	   union	   organised	   a	   few	   VET	   programmes	   for	   skill	   development,	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which	  were	  open	  to	  also	  non-­‐members.	  Despite	  its	  interest,	  Hak-­‐İŞ	  did	  not	  have	  
much	  influence	  on	  the	  VET	  policies	  in	  2002-­‐2011	  as	  it	  was	  not	  always	  included	  
in	   the	   policy	   platforms	   for	   VET,	   where	   Türk-­‐İŞ	   was	   invited	   as	   the	   main	  
representative	  of	  workers.12	  	  
Similar	   to	   the	   unions,	   although	   VET	   has	   been	   in	   the	   political	   agendas	   of	  main	  
opposition	   parties	   (the	   Republican	   People’s	   Party-­‐	   CHP	   and	   Nationalist	  
Movement	   Party-­‐	  MHP),	   it	   has	   been	   discussed	   as	   part	   of	   the	   education	   policy	  
while	  the	  role	  of	  VET	  as	  a	  ‘productive’	  social	  policy	  tool	  to	  address	  labour	  market	  
risks	  has	  been	  rarely	  mentioned.	  
Changes	  in	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  Turkish	  VET	  system	  
The	   AKP	   governments	   in	   the	   2000s	   introduced	   a	   variety	   of	   VET	   policies	   to	  
address	   the	   economic	   interests	   of	   its	   constituents	   from	   both	   the	   business	   and	  
working-­‐class	  outsiders.	  This	  can	  be	  a	  challenging	  task	  as	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  two	  
groups	  sometimes	  contradict	  one	  another.	  In	  fact,	  the	  party’s	  links	  with	  the	  SME	  
organisations	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  representative	  of	  labour	  market	  outsiders	  could	  
result	   in	   a	   VET	   system	   that	   addressed	   only	   the	   SMEs’	   interests.	  However,	   also	  
being	  a	  representative	  of	  the	  labour	  market	  outsiders,	  and	  aiming	  to	  address	  its	  
constituents’	   concerns,	   the	   AKP	   governments	   incorporated	   these	   workers’	  
interests	   into	   the	   VET	   policies.	   This	   section	   explores	   the	   VET	   policies	   in	   the	  
2000s	   and	   analyses	   them	   based	   on	   the	   four	   neurologic	   points	   suggested	   by	  
Busemeyer	   and	   Trampusch	   (2012),	   namely	   who	   provides,	   who	   pays,	   who	  
controls	   and	   the	   permeability	   between	   vocational	   and	   general	   education.	   It	  
argues	   that	   the	   representation	   of	   both	   SMEs’	   and	   labour	   market	   outsiders’	  
interests	   led	   to	   a	   VET	   system	   with	   high	   state	   commitment	   and	   higher	   firm	  
involvement	  that	  is	  a	  more	  viable	  alternative	  to	  general	  education.13	  	  
a. Provision	  
The	   Turkish	   VET	   system	   experienced	   substantial	   changes	   regarding	   the	  
provision	   of	   VET	   in	   the	   2000s,	  when	  both	   the	   state	   commitment	   to	   and	   firms’	  
involvement	   in	  provision	  of	  VET	  has	   increased.	  Although	  the	  state	  remained	  to	  
be	  the	  main	  provider,	  firms	  started	  to	  take	  more	  part	  in	  VET	  provision,	  especially	  
regarding	   continuing-­‐VET.	   Traditionally,	   firms’	   main	   involvement	   in	   VET	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provision	  has	  happened	  through	  employing	  apprentices	  or	   trainees	   from	  VHSs.	  
In	  the	  apprenticeship	  system,	  firms	  are	  the	  main	  providers	  of	  VET,	  as	  80	  per	  cent	  
of	   training	   takes	   place	   in	   firm	   while	   students	   spend	   rest	   of	   their	   time	   in	   a	  
Vocational	  Training	  Centre.	   In	   contrast,	   VET	   at	   upper-­‐secondary	   level	   happens	  
mostly	   in	  schools	  centrally	  managed	  by	  MEB	  and	  while	   the	  VHS	  students	  must	  
conduct	  an	  internship,	  this	  constitutes	  a	  small	  share	  of	  their	  training.	  	  
With	  the	  policy	  changes	  in	  the	  2000s,	  firms	  gained	  an	  important	  opportunity	  to	  
get	   involved	   in	   VET	   provision	   within	   the	   VHS	   system.	   A	   legislation	   in	   2007	  
relaxed	  the	  centralised	  management	  of	  VHSs	  and	  enabled	  cooperation	  between	  
VHSs	  and	  private	  firms.14	  Furthermore,	  various	  policies	  have	  been	  introduced	  to	  
improve	  the	  links	  between	  VHSs	  and	  firms,	  such	  as	  the	  state	  subsidies	  to	  firms	  to	  
establish	  VHSs	  (ERG,	  2013).	  This	  policy	  led	  to	  successful	  VHSs	  founded	  by	  firms	  
in	   key	   industrial	   areas	   (ERG,	   2015).	   Despite	   these	   developments,	   firms’	  
involvement	   in	   VET	   provision	   in	   VHSs	   has	   remained	   limited,	   as	   the	   education	  
within	   the	   schools	   is	  mostly	   delivered	   by	  MEB	   teachers	   and	   the	   curriculum	   is	  
centrally	  managed	  by	  the	  MEB.	  	  
The	  main	  change	  regarding	  firms’	  involvement	  in	  VET	  provision	  happened	  in	  the	  
continuing-­‐VET	   system.	  While	   İŞKUR	  manages	   the	   retraining	   programmes	   for	  
the	  unemployed,	  private	  bodies	  deliver	   training,	  where	  on-­‐the-­‐job	   training	  and	  
the	  UMEM	  project	  formed	  a	  major	  share.	  For	  on-­‐the-­‐job	  training,	  İŞKUR	  provides	  
subsidies	   to	   firms	   to	   recruit	  unskilled	  workers	  and	   train	   them	  within	   the	   firm.	  
This	   is	   a	   rather	   new	   project	   but	   started	   to	   become	   important	   within	   İŞKUR’s	  
continuing-­‐VET	  activities.	  
The	  UMEM	  was	  a	  public	  retraining	  programme	  for	  the	  unemployed	  and	  started	  
in	  2010	  as	  a	   result	  of	  TOBB’s	   call	   for	   ‘vocational	   training	  mobilisation’	  and	   the	  
government’s	  aim	  to	  find	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  unemployment	  problem.	  In	  the	  UMEM,	  
MEB	   organised	   theoretical	   training	   while	   İŞKUR	   linked	   the	   unemployed	   with	  
courses	  and	  paid	  a	  daily	  allowance	  to	  trainees.	  TOBB	  and	  TOBB-­‐ETÜ,	  a	  university	  
established	  by	  TOBB,	  were	  responsible	  for	  determining	  the	  course	  content	  based	  
on	  member	  firms’	  skill	  needs.	  Furthermore,	  local	  chambers	  linked	  firms	  with	  the	  
unemployed	   and	   supervised	   firm-­‐level	   training.	   The	   main	   beneficiaries	   of	   the	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programme	  were	  the	  SMEs,	  which	  constituted	  68	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  firms	  within	  the	  
programme	   in	   2011	   (TOBB-­‐ETÜ,	   2011).	   Although	   the	   programme	   had	   certain	  
problems	   in	   its	   application,	   it	   was	   a	   significant	   step	   in	   increasing	   firm’s	  
participation	   in	   VET.	   Furthermore,	   a	   comprehensive	   and	   a	   longer-­‐term	  
continuing-­‐VET	   programme	  was	   developed	   between	   the	   state	   and	   TOBB	   upon	  
UMEM’s	  completion	  (İŞKUR,	  2016).	  	  
b. Financing	  	  
The	  state	  has	   the	  main	  responsibility	   for	   financing	  VET	   in	  Turkey	  whilst	   firms’	  
share	  in	  VET	  financing	  has	  increased	  in	  recent	  years.	  VHSs,	  which	  comprise	  the	  
largest	   share	   of	   the	   Turkish	   VET	   system,	   are	   funded	   by	   the	   public	   education	  
budget.	  In	  contract,	  the	  financial	  responsibility	  is	  shared	  between	  firms	  and	  the	  
state	  in	  the	  apprenticeship	  system	  and	  continuing-­‐VET	  programmes.	  	  
The	   state’s	   commitment	   to	   VET	   financing	   increased	   substantially	   in	   the	   2000s	  
and	  VET	  became	  an	   important	   expenditure	   in	   the	  public	   budget	   (Figure	  2	   and	  
Figure	  3).	  Furthermore,	   spending	   for	  VET	  at	  upper-­‐secondary	   level	  as	   share	  of	  
GDP	   was	   higher	   in	   Turkey	   compared	   to	   other	   MICs	   and	   countries	   that	   have	  
recently	  moved	   from	  middle-­‐income	   to	   high-­‐income	   group,	   and	   has	   increased	  
over	  the	  last	  decade	  (Figure	  4).	  
Figure 2: Spending on initial VET across years (sum of central and local governments) 
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Figure 3: Spending on active labour market policies as share of total government expenditure (%) 
 
Source: ÇSGB (2016); TÜİK (2016) 
 
Figure 4: VET spending at upper-secondary level in 2013 (% of GDP) 
 
Source: OECD (2014) 
Firms	   also	   have	   certain	   expenses	   due	   to	   training	   of	   apprentices	   and	   VHS	  
students,	   as	   well	   as	   retraining	   of	   their	   own	   workers.	   Although	   training	   of	  
apprentices	  and	  VHS	  students	  are	  subsidised	  by	  the	  state,	  firms	  are	  expected	  to	  
cover	   some	   costs	   in	   this	   regard.	   With	   the	   changes	   in	   the	   2000s,	   firms’	  
responsibility	   in	   VET	   financing	   increased	   in	   two	   main	   areas.	   Firstly,	   firms	  
became	  an	  important	  financier	  for	  the	  new	  VET	  schools	  established	  in	  organised	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Secondly,	  firms	  have	  an	  important	  role	  in	  funding	  continuing-­‐VET	  programmes.	  
In	  the	  public	  retraining	  programmes,	  firms	  are	  responsible	  for	  bearing	  the	  costs	  
of	   firm-­‐level	   training	   and	   they	   need	   to	   meet	   the	   costs	   of	   retraining	   and	  
certification	  of	  their	  workers,	  when	  certification	  is	  required	  by	  law	  (see	  below).	  
There	  is	  no	  publicly	  available	  data	  to	  assess	  firms’	  involvement	  in	  VET	  financing.	  
World	   Bank	   Enterprise	   Surveys	   show	   that	   28	   per	   cent	   of	   the	   surveyed	   firms	  
provided	  training	  to	  their	  workers	  in	  2013,	  which	  may	  signal	  a	  low	  level	  of	  firm	  
contribution	  to	  VET	  financing	  (World	  Bank,	  2013).	  	  
c. Control	  
The	   state	   continues	   to	   have	   the	   main	   control	   over	   the	   VET	   system	   in	   Turkey	  
while	  firms	  have	  also	  gained	  some	  power	  in	  the	  2000s.	  The	  Turkish	  initial-­‐VET	  
system	  has	  been	  criticised	  for	  being	  highly	  centralised	  under	  MEB,	  not	  giving	  the	  
local	   authorities	   and	   other	   stakeholders	   any	   voice	   (ERG,	   2012a).	   While	   some	  
steps	  were	  taken	  in	  the	  2000s	  to	  decentralise	  the	  system,	  the	  state	  remains	  the	  
main	  authority	   in	  the	   initial-­‐VET	  system	  (Taşlı,	  2017).	  Firms’	  control	  regarding	  
the	   initial-­‐VET	   is	   still	   low	   and	   the	   government	   rejected	   TOBB’s	   request	   about	  
transferring	   VHSs’	   management	   to	   itself	   (Güçlü,	   2016).	   The	   state	   also	   has	  
important	   control	   over	   the	   continuing-­‐VET	   system	   through	   the	  organisation	  of	  
continuing-­‐VET	   programmes	   by	   İŞKUR	   and	   the	   management	   of	   the	   skill	  
standardisation	   and	   certification	   system	   by	   the	   Vocational	   Qualifications	  
Authority	   (MYK).	   The	   MYK	   has	   become	   a	   powerful	   entity	   in	   the	   Turkish	   skill	  
system	  and	  is	  controlled	  mainly	  by	  the	  state,	  although	  other	  stakeholders	  such	  as	  
TOBB	  have	  some	  influence	  (Sancak	  and	  Özel,	  2018).	  	  
While	  firms’	  control	  over	  VET	  has	  been	  very	  low	  in	  Turkey,	  they	  started	  to	  have	  
some	  role	  in	  this	  regard	  in	  the	  2000s.	  Firms,	  and	  especially	  the	  SMEs,	  share	  some	  
responsibility	  in	  the	  management	  of	  VET	  through	  TOBB’s	  inclusion	  in	  three	  main	  
VET	   domains:	   (1)	   policy	   platforms	   for	  making	   VET	   policy,	   (2)	   its	   cooperation	  
with	  İŞKUR	  for	  continuing-­‐VET	  programmes,	  and	  (3)	  its	  involvement	  in	  the	  MYK	  
and	   the	   skill	   certification	   system.	   While	   other	   business	   representatives	   were	  
included	   in	   some	   policy	   platforms	   regarding	   VET,	   TOBB	   has	   been	   the	   main	  
business	  representative	  in	  all	  debates	  related	  to	  VET.	  	  Some	  important	  platforms	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with	  TOBB’s	  influence	  include	  the	  National	  Education	  Council,	  the	  National	  VET	  
Council,	   Provincial	   Employment	   and	   VET	   Councils,	   and	   the	   Vocational	   and	  
Technical	   Education	   Strategy	   Paper	   and	   Action	   Plan.	   TOBB	   had	   substantial	  
influence	  on	   the	  development	  of	   the	  VET	   strategy	   and	   currently	   is	   responsible	  
for	  enforcing	  a	  number	  of	  strategies	  stated	  in	  this	  document	  (MEB,	  2012b).	  
In	  addition	  to	  policy	  platforms,	  TOBB	  has	  become	  an	  important	  partner	  in	  public	  
VET	   institutions.	   Following	   the	   UMEM	   project,	   TOBB	   was	   given	   further	  
responsibility	  regarding	  continuing-­‐VET.	  It	  is	  currently	  the	  İŞKUR’s	  main	  partner	  
in	   ‘Vocational	   Education	   and	   Employment	   Mobilisation’,	   which	   develops	  
retraining	   programmes	   for	   the	   unemployed	   based	   on	   firms’	   needs	   (İŞKUR,	  
2016).	   It	   is	   one	   of	   the	  main	  members	   of	  MYK’s	   Executive	   Board,	  which	   is	   the	  
ultimate	  decision-­‐making	  body	  in	  the	  skill	  certification	  system	  (Official	  Gazette,	  
2006).	   It	   is	   also	   a	   default	   member	   in	   MYK’s	   sectoral	   committees,	   which	   are	  
responsible	   for	   developing	   occupational	   standards.	   In	   addition	   to	   this,	   TOBB	  
gained	   control	   on	   VET	   through	   operating	   skill	   certification	   institutes	   and	  
distributing	  occupational	  certificates	  all	  over	  Turkey	  (Sancak	  and	  Özel,	  2018).	  	  
d. VET	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  general	  education	  
With	  the	  increased	  state	  commitment	  to	  and	  firm	  involvement	  in	  the	  public	  VET	  
system,	   VET	   has	   become	   a	   more	   viable	   alternative	   to	   general	   education	   in	  
Turkey	   in	   the	   2000s	   and	   started	   attracting	   individuals	   from	   the	   middle-­‐class.	  
The	  initial-­‐VET	  system	  in	  Turkey	  had	  mainly	  focused	  on	  generating	  specific	  skills	  
where	  its	  participants	  lacked	  key	  general	  skills	  such	  as	  reasoning	  and	  problem-­‐
solving	   (Gür	  et	   al.,	   2012).	  The	   focus	  on	   specific	   skills	   together	  with	   the	  quality	  
problems	  of	  VHSs	  have	  restricted	  VHS	  students’	  possibility	  to	  continue	  to	  higher	  
education	   (ERG,	   2012a).	   The	   changes	   in	   the	   Turkish	   VET	   system	   in	   the	   2000s	  
have	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  increasing	  VET’s	  appeal	  to	  individuals.	  On	  the	  
one	  hand,	  higher	  firm	  involvement	  in	  VET	  would	  facilitate	  individuals’	  transition	  
to	   labour	   market	   and	   reduce	   the	   risk	   of	   unemployment.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	  
continuing	  state	  control	  would	  decrease	  workers’	  dependence	  on	  firms	  for	  VET	  
and	  increase	  their	  horizontal	  and	  vertical	  mobility	  in	  the	  labour	  market	  (Sancak,	  
forthcoming).	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There	   were	   several	   changes	   in	   the	   VET	   system	   in	   the	   2000s	   to	   improve	   the	  
general	   skills	   of	   VHS	   students,	   which	   have	   played	   a	   role	   in	   increasing	   VET’s	  
appeal	  to	  larger	  groups.	  The	  share	  of	  general	  subjects	  in	  the	  teaching	  at	  VHSs	  has	  
been	  expanded,	  which	  has	  facilitated	  the	  development	  of	  more	  polyvalent	  skills	  
for	   VHS	   students	   and	   thus,	   increased	   their	   possibility	   to	   continue	   to	   higher	  
education	   (ERG,	   2012a;	   Busemeyer,	   2015c).15 	  Furthermore,	   a	   modular	   VET	  
system	  was	  introduced	  in	  2006,	  and	  the	  mobility	  between	  general	  and	  vocational	  
tracks	   as	  well	   as	   among	  different	   vocational	   tracks	  was	   enabled	   (ERG,	   2012a).	  
With	   this,	   students	  were	  given	   the	  opportunity	  of	  developing	  skills	   in	  different	  
and	  multiple	  occupations,	  and	  hence	  increasing	  their	  employability.	  	  
Fundamental	   policy	   changes	   took	   place	   in	   the	   2000s,	   which	   reduced	   the	  
variances	  among	  different	   schools	   and	   increased	  VET	  schools’	   appeal.	   In	  2010,	  
the	  number	  of	  school	  types	  was	  decreased	  from	  79	  to	  15.	  In	  2013,	  General	  High	  
Schools	   (Düz	   Lise)	   were	   closed	   and	   converted	   to	   Anatolian	   High	   Schools	  
(Anadolu	  Lisesi)	  focusing	  on	  academic	  training	  for	  students	  with	  higher	  academic	  
scores	  and	  to	  VHSs	  or	  İmam	  Hatips	  for	  those	  with	  lower	  academic	  achievements	  
(ERG,	   2015).	   Furthermore,	   the	   ‘ratio	   obstacle’	   was	   abolished	   in	   2011,	   which	  
increased	  the	  possibility	  of	  VHS	  students	  to	  continue	  to	  higher	  education.	  	  
With	  all	  these	  developments,	  the	  share	  of	  students	  in	  vocational	  tracks	  increased	  
significantly	   in	   the	   2000s	   (Figure	   4).	   The	   possibility	   of	   continuing	   to	   higher	  
education	  has	  played	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  increasing	  VET’s	  appeal:	  the	  share	  of	  VHS	  
students	   among	   the	   new	  entrants	   of	   upper-­‐secondary	   schools	   increased	  by	   35	  
per	   cent	   in	   2010-­‐2013,	   right	   after	   the	   ‘ratio	   obstacle’	   was	   lifted	   (ERG,	   2014).	  
These	   developments	   have	   extended	   VET’s	   appeal	   also	   to	   the	  middle-­‐class	   and	  
about	  30	  per	  cent	  of	  VHS	  graduates	  continued	  to	  higher	  education	  in	  2014	  (MEB,	  
2015).	   In	   2019,	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	   history,	   some	   of	   the	   highest	   achieving	  
students	  preferred	  to	  study	  in	  VHSs	  and	  the	  share	  of	  students	  wanting	  to	  study	  
in	  VHSs	  increased	  substantially	  (Milliyet,	  2019).	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Source: ERG, 2014, 2012b, 2010 
 
 
Table 2: Partisan politics and VET in Turkey 
Socio-­‐political	  
group 
Political	  party VET	  output Example 
• Large	  firms	  	  






• Low	  public	  commitment	  
• Sporadic	  involvement	  of	  large	  
firms	  
• Low	  permeability	  
Turkey	   prior	   to	  
the	  2000s 
• SME	  






• Statist	  initial	  VET	  with	  high	  
public	  commitment	  and	  some	  
firm	  involvement	  
• Strong	  continuing	  VET	  with	  
high	  public	  commitment	  and	  
high	  firm	  involvement	  
• High	  permeability	  between	  
vocational	  and	  general	  
education	  




This	   article	  has	   investigated	   the	  political	   competition,	  partisan	  politics	   and	   the	  
impact	  of	  these	  on	  VET	  policies	  in	  the	  2000s	  in	  Turkey,	  and	  has	  compared	  these	  
dynamics	  with	  the	  period	  prior	  to	  the	  2000s.	  Its	  shows	  that	  the	  2000s	  are	  critical	  
for	  the	  VET	  system	  and	  partisan	  politics	  in	  Turkey,	  leading	  to	  important	  changes	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in	   the	   public	   VET	   system.	   While	   the	   insiders	   and	   outsiders	   have	   had	   distinct	  
cultural	  and	  economic	  interests	  in	  Turkey,	  the	  political	  competition	  and	  political	  
parties	   prior	   to	   the	   2000s	   focused	   mostly	   on	   the	   cultural	   interests.	   This	   has	  
resulted	   in	   the	   continuation	   of	   the	  VET	   system	   that	  was	   developed	  during	   the	  
closed	  economy	  period	  and	  which	  benefited	  the	  insiders	  more	  (Table	  2).	  	  
In	   the	   2000s,	   the	   governing	  AKP	  played	   a	   key	   role	   for	   the	   changes	   in	   the	  VET	  
system	  in	  three	  main	  ways.	  Firstly,	  AKP	  shifted	  the	   focus	  of	  partisan	  politics	  to	  
economic	   interests,	   which	   also	   helped	   the	   party	   to	   develop	   and	   maintain	   its	  
support	  base	  comprising	  the	  outsiders	  amongst	  both	  firms	  and	  workers	  –	  SMEs	  
and	   workers	   with	   insecure	   employment.	  17 	  Secondly,	   the	   party	   deliberately	  
chose	   the	   VET	   system	   to	   address	   the	   SMEs’	   and	   workers’	   economic	   interests.	  
While	   the	   SMEs	   directly	   asked	   for	   VET	   workers’	   demands	   were	   not	   as	  
straightforward.	   Instead,	   it	   was	   the	   AKP	   governments	   who	   proposed	   VET	   to	  
address	  workers’	  concerns	  about	  unemployment	  and	  economic	  security.	  Thirdly,	  
AKP	  governments	  played	  a	  critical	   role	   in	  reflecting	   the	   interests	  of	  both	  SMEs	  
and	  workers	   in	   the	   VET	   policies	   in	   the	   2000s.	   To	   address	   the	   SMEs’	   needs,	   it	  
increased	   the	   flexibility	   of	   the	   system	   and	   facilitated	   firms’	   individual	   and	  
collective	  involvement	  in	  VET	  provision,	  control	  as	  well	  as	  financing.	  To	  ensure	  
labour	   market	   outsiders’	   interests,	   the	   governments	   maintained	   the	   state’s	  
control	   over	   the	   system,	   increased	   the	   share	   of	   general	   skill	   training	   in	   the	  
system	  and	   fostered	  VET’s	   viability	   as	   an	   alternative	   to	   general	   education.	   For	  
addressing	  both	  groups’	  concerns,	  AKP	  has	  increased	  the	  state’s	  commitment	  to	  
VET	  and	  raised	  spending	  in	  this	  regard.	  All	  these	  have	  resulted	  in	  a	  VET	  system	  
with	  higher	  state	  commitment,	  higher	  firm	  involvement	  and	  higher	  permeability,	  
carrying	  out	   the	   characteristics	   of	  multiple	  VET	   systems	   in	   advanced	   capitalist	  
economies.	  	  
Table	  2	  summarises	  the	  findings	  on	  Turkey	  and	  shows	  how	  this	  research	  on	  MIC	  
will	  complement	  Table	  1,	  which	  is	  based	  on	  advanced	  industrialised	  countries.	  In	  
the	   Turkish	   case,	   the	   coalition	   between	   the	   SMEs	   and	   AKP	   together	   with	   the	  
increased	   firm	   involvement	   in	   the	   VET	   system	   may	   signal	   some	   resemblance	  
between	   the	   AKP	   and	   Christian	   Democrat	   parties.	   Nevertheless,	   there	   are	  
important	  points	  that	  differentiate	  the	  Turkish	  VET	  system	  from	  those	  systems	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in	   countries	   with	   Christian	   Democrat	   governments.	   In	   Turkey,	   the	   workers’	  
interests	   were	   incorporated	   through	   AKP’s	   political	   articulation	   rather	   than	  
collective	   organisation	   by	   workers.	   Therefore,	   the	   VET	   policies	   AKP	  
governments	  have	  reflected	  the	  interests	  of	  labour	  market	  outsiders	  rather	  than	  
insiders,	   which	   was	   the	   case	   in	   latter.	   Labour	   unions,	   which	   are	   part	   of	   the	  
coalition	   in	   countries	   with	   Christian	   Democrat	   governments	   and	   usually	  
represent	  the	  labour	  market	  insiders,	  did	  not	  become	  a	  part	  of	  the	  Turkish	  VET	  
system	  and	  a	  corporatist	  VET	  system	  has	  not	  emerged.	  Furthermore,	  SMEs	  were	  
the	  outsiders	  in	  the	  political	  economic	  system	  in	  Turkey,	  which	  emerged	  during	  
the	   ISI	   period,	  while	   SMEs	  were	   key	   part	   of	   the	   industrialisation	   in	   the	   latter.	  	  
Last,	   the	   state	   has	   remained	   the	  main	   actor	   in	   the	   Turkish	   VET	   system	  while	  
firms	  have	  more	  power	  in	  VET	  systems	  with	  Christian	  Democratic	  governments.	  	  
With	   the	   analysis	   on	   Turkey,	   this	   article	   hopes	   to	   expand	   the	   discussion	   on	  
partisan	   politics	   and	   VET	   beyond	   advanced	   capitalist	   economies	   and	   initiate	   a	  
new	  line	  of	  research	  on	  the	  VET	  systems	  in	  MICs.	  The	  analysis	  here	  shows	  that	  
partisan	   politics	   indeed	   matter	   for	   VET	   systems	   in	   MICs	   and	   can	   result	   in	  
different	   systems	   from	   the	   ones	   in	   advanced	   economies.	   The	   domain	   of	   party	  
competition,	   namely	   the	   economic	   or	   cultural	   interests,	   is	   key	   for	   the	  
development	   of	   VET	   policies	   and	   may	   explain	   why	   some	   MICs	   could	   make	  
changes	   in	   their	   VET	   systems	   in	   the	   21st	   century	   while	   others	   could	   not.	  
Furthermore,	  when	  the	  economic	  interests	  are	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  partisan	  politics,	  
the	   socio-­‐political	   groups	   included	   in	   the	   partisan	   alliance	   will	   influence	   the	  
structure	   of	   VET	   systems	   in	   distinct	   ways.	   For	   example,	   the	   alliance	   between	  
AKP,	  SMEs	  and	  labour	  market	  outsiders	  in	  Turkey	  has	  led	  to	  a	  VET	  system	  with	  
high	   state	   commitment	   and	   some	   firm	   involvement.	  However,	   the	   structure	   of	  
the	   VET	   systems	   in	   other	  MICs	  would	   be	   different	   if	   the	   VET	   policies	   in	   these	  
countries	  were	   developed	   through	   different	   alliances.	   Therefore,	   this	   study	   on	  
Turkey	  can	  be	  complemented	  with	  further	  studies	  on	  other	  MICs,	  which	  then	  can	  
enable	   a	   comparison	   on	   the	   role	   of	   partisan	   politics	   and	   VET	   structure.	  
Additionally,	  by	  studying	  the	  impact	  of	  outsiders	  and	  their	  partisan	  alliances,	  this	  
article	  may	  trigger	  new	  questions	  about	  the	  future	  of	  VET	  systems	  in	  advanced	  
economies,	   where	   the	   traditional	   partisan	   alliances	   representing	   only	   the	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insiders	   are	   being	   challenged	   and	   the	   outsiders	   are	   building	   links	   with	   new	  
political	  parties.	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1	  Chile	  has	  recently	  become	  a	  high-­‐income	  country.	  	  
2	  Later	  years	  are	  not	  included	  because	  of	  the	  dynamics	  in	  both	  domestic	  and	  international	  
politics,	  which	  have	  changed	  the	  AKP’s	  policies	  and	  the	  political	  coalitions	  in	  the	  country.	  	  
3	  While	  the	  analysis	  of	  Busemeyer	  and	  Trampusch	  (2012)	  includes	  only	  initial-­‐VET,	  namely	  VET	  
in	   scope	  of	   formal	   education	   system,	   the	  one	  by	  Thelen	   (2014)	   also	   considers	   continuing-­‐VET,	  
such	  as	  training	  programmes	  for	  the	  unemployed.	  	  	  
4	  The	  interviews	  were	  conducted	  in	  September	  2014–October	  2015	  as	  part	  of	  a	   larger	  research	  
project	  and	  at	  different	   times	  within	   this	  period.	   	  The	   interviewees	   include	   the	  representatives	  
from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Education	  (MEB),	  Ministry	  of	  Labour	  and	  Social	  Security	  (ÇSGB),	  central	  and	  
local	   offices	   of	   the	  Union	  of	   Chambers	   and	  Commodity	  Exchanges	   of	  Turkey	   (TOBB)	   (in	  Bursa	  
and	  Izmit),	  Education	  Reform	  Initiative	  (ERG),	  Foundation	  for	  Supporting	  Vocational	  Education	  
and	   the	   Small	   Enterprises	   (MEKSA),	   Ikitelli	   Organised	   Industrial	   Zone	   (IKOSB),	   labour	   unions	  
including	   Türk-­‐Metal	   and	   Birleşik-­‐Metal,	   Turkish	   Employers’	   Association	   of	   Metal	   Industries	  
(MESS),	   Istanbul	   International	  Centre	   for	  Private	  Sector	   in	  Development	  (IICPSD),	  headmasters	  
of	  vocational	  high	  schools	  and	  vocational	  training	  institutes	  located	  in	  Istanbul	  and	  Bursa.	  	  
5	  This	  terminology	  involves	  outsiders	  amongst	  not	  only	  workers,	  but	  also	  firms	  and	  thus,	  is	  more	  
comprehensive	  than	  the	  terminology	  in	  welfare	  state	  literature,	  such	  as	  the	  one	  by	  David	  Rueda	  
(2006).	  	  	  
6	  The	   ‘centre’	   and	   ‘periphery’	   terminology	   here,	   which	   concerns	   the	   two	  main	   socio-­‐economic	  
and	  political	  groups	   in	  Turkey,	   should	  not	  be	  confused	  with	   the	  core-­‐periphery	   terminology	   in	  
World	  Systems	  Theory,	  which	  refers	  to	  the	  inter-­‐state	  dynamics	  in	  the	  international	  order.	  	  
7	  Although	  they	  are	  not	  really	  winners	  in	  the	  system	  in	  general,	  as	  even	  the	  formal	  workers	  face	  
important	  problems	  including	  restricted	  social	  protection	  and	  security.	  	  	  
8	  Although	   there	   have	   been	   significant	   divisions	   of	   interests	   with	   TUSKON	   after	   the	   clashes	  
between	   the	   AKP	   and	   the	   Gülen	   movement.	   TUSKON	   was	   closed	   in	   2016	   because	   of	   coup	  
allegations.	  
9	  Interview	  notes.	  	  
10	  Trade	  union	  density	  in	  Turkey	  was	  10.6	  in	  2008	  (OECD,	  2018).	  	  
11	  Interviews	  with	  Türk-­‐Metal	  and	  Birleşik-­‐Metal.	  	  	  
12	  In	  later	  years,	  and	  after	  2011,	  through	  its	  increasing	  alliance	  with	  AKP,	  Hak-­‐İŞ	  replaced	  Türk-­‐İŞ	  
in	  several	  key	  VET	  platforms	  (Öztürk,	  2018).	  	  
13	  Even	  though	  it	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  the	  AKP’s	  main	  aim	  was	  to	  promote	  İmam	  Hatips	  within	  
the	   cultural	   interests,	   it	   would	   be	   misleading	   to	   reduce	   the	   argument	   to	   this.	   There	   was	   still	  
significant	  public	  investment	  on	  other	  types	  of	  VET	  and	  TOBB	  has	  become	  a	  key	  partner	  and	  with	  
no	  involvement	  in	  İmam	  Hatips.	  Additionally,	  the	  directorate	  of	  VET	  schools	  was	  later	  separated	  
from	  that	  of	  İmam	  Hatips.	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14	  Interview	   with	   Canatan,	   N.,	   Expert	   at	   the	   Directorate	   General	   for	   Vocational	   and	   Technical	  
Education,	  MEB,	  Ankara,	  19/09/2015.	  
15	  The	  quality	  of	   education	   in	  VHSs	   is	   still	  not	  very	  high	   I	  do	  not	   claim	   that	   these	   students	   can	  
now	   easily	   continue	   to	   higher	   education.	   However,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   point	   that	   with	   the	  
increased	  training	  on	  general	  subjects,	   it	   is	  more	  possible	   to	  continue	  to	  higher	  education	  than	  
before	  for	  these	  students.	  	  
16	  The	  share	  of	  students	  includes	  the	  schools	  managed	  by	  the	  Directorate	  General	  for	  Vocational	  
and	  Technical	  Education.	  Therefore,	  the	  numbers	  do	  not	  include	  the	  ones	  from	  İmam	  Hatips.	  
17	  AKP’s	  central	  role	  in	  this	  might	  be	  related	  to	  the	  increasing	  authoritarianism	  in	  Turkey	  in	  the	  
later	  years	  and	  even	   to	   the	  authoritarian	  nature	  of	   the	  developmental	   state	   in	  East	  Asia	   in	   the	  
1970s	   and	   1990s.	   Furthermore,	   the	   links	   between	   AKP	   and	   SMEs,	   as	   well	   the	   labour	   market	  
outsiders	  through	  Hak-­‐İŞ,	  become	  more	  clientelistic	  in	  later	  years,	  and	  the	  politics	  and	  impacts	  of	  
these	   dynamics	  will	   be	   different	   from	   those	   in	   the	   2000s	   (Buğra	   and	   Savaşkan,	   2014;	   Tansel,	  
2018).	  These	  are	   important	  questions	  about	   the	   sustainability	  of	   the	  partisan	  politics	   and	  VET	  
systems	  and	  should	  be	  investigated	  through	  further	  studies.	  	  
